Illicit Trade and Extortion: The Nexus Between Boko Haram’s Revenue Streams and Regional Instability

Abstract

Illicit trade and extortion have emerged as central financial lifelines for violent non-state actors across Africa. In Nigeria, Boko Haram’s involvement in transnational trafficking, extortion, and informal cross-border economies has sustained its insurgency and deepened regional instability in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel. This paper explores the intersection between illicit trade, insurgent financing, and regional insecurity, highlighting how Boko Haram has evolved from a domestic religious sect into a transnational network embedded within the informal economy. Using a qualitative synthesis of existing empirical studies, policy documents, and secondary data, the study examines how the group’s economic strategies underpin its longevity and how weak governance structures, porous borders, and underdevelopment perpetuate these dynamics. Findings reveal that Boko Haram’s exploitation of illicit trade routes, revenue from extortion, and manipulation of local markets have not only financed its operations but also entrenched cycles of displacement, poverty, and insecurity across Nigeria and its neighbours. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for economic stabilisation, community resilience, and regional cooperation aimed at disrupting terrorist financing through illicit economies